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COMMENT
DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHERE BOTH CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTE THE SAME ACT
INTRODUCTION
This comment's concern is the situation in which a municipality and
a state each define the same conduct as criminal, and each, in a
separate action prosecutes the same defendant for the same act.
The sole question explored in this comment is whether there is, or
should be, a bar, on the ground of double jeopardy, to city or state
prosecutions where the other has prosecuted. An attempt has been
made exhaustively to canvass the question and also the position of the
state and federal courts.
The double jeopardy issue may arise, or at least be indirectly de-
cided, in three possible situations. First, the defense will occur most
often where the defendant has already been tried by the city (or
state), and then the second prosecution has been started by the state
(or city).' The defense will, of course, be urged in the latter trial.
In the second situation, a prosecution by the city where the state has
not yet prosecuted, the defendant may argue that the city prosecution
is invalid.' The defendant, propounding this argument, will challenge
the validity of an ordinance, claiming that it conflicts with state law."
The premise of the defendant's argument is that it would constitute
double jeopardy for both a city and a state to prosecute; therefore
if the city prosecuted first, the state is precluded from enforcing its
penal law. The fact that a state may not be considering a prosecution
is not important. The important point is that, as a matter of law, the
state cannot prosecute a violation of its statute in the particular case.
Thus, since the existence of a conflict is shown, the ordinance is
invalid, and any conviction thereon should be reversed.' Of course, if
I Indeed there may, in addition, be a prosecution by the United States if it too,
has defined the particular act as a crime. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) ; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2 For example, see State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363 (1926).
3 For example, see Ex Parte Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac. 233 (1923).
4 It should be remembered that pre-emption may apply even though the state has
not specifically covered the particular offense which the city ordinance purports to
define. In re Lane, 22 Cal. Reptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1962). This comment,
however, has a more limited concern, i.e., attention is focused on the case where both
a city and a state have actually regulated the same act, both defining the act as an
offense.
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both a city and a state are allowed to prosecute without placing a
defendant in double jeopardy, then there is no conflict, and an other-
wise valid ordinance is not defective.6
The third situation which has an impact, although indirect, on the
double jeopardy issue is one in which other issues of criminal pro-
cedure are decided. For example, a court may hold that a city has a
right to appeal in an ordinance prosecution. The ground usually is
that an ordinance prosecution is a civil, not a criminal action.7 Then,
if the court is subsequently confronted with a double jeopardy issue, it
might rely on the prior holding that an ordinance prosecution is a
civil action; therefore the prohibition against double jeopardy does
not apply.'
Thus, the double jeopardy issue has ramifications and importance
not only in itself, but also, it may be controlling where the validity of
an ordinance or a proceeding under an ordinance is brought into ques-
tion. In addition, the reasoning which a court uses to decide the
double jeopardy issue may be used where other criminal procedure
rights are in question.' With these points in mind we move to the
analysis used by courts when faced with a double jeopardy issue.
COURT DISPOSITION OF THE BASIC ISSUE
The Present Majority Rule. The clear weight of authority"0 allows
prosecutions for the same criminal act by both a city and a state
where the act constitutes a violation of an ordinance and a statute.1
A few states hold to the contrary, and they will be considered later.
The courts allowing the double prosecutions do so on various
grounds. The reasons include: 1) the double offense doctrine: that
5 State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248, 28 Ad. 28 (1893); State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215(1869; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128 (1854). See also City of Billings v. Herold,
130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956).
6 State v. Preston, 4 Idaho 215, 38 Pac. 694 (1894).
7 City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588 (1878).
8 State v. Gustin, 152 Mo. 108, 53 S.W. 421 (1899), relied on Kansas City v. Neal,
122 Mo. 232, 26 S.W. 695 (1894), which in turn relied on City of Kansas v. Clark,
68 Mo. 588 (1878).
9 See City of Fort Scott v. Arbuckle, 165 Kan. 374, 196 P.2d 217 (1948), where
the court reasoned that § 10 of the Kansas Constitution covers both double jeopardy
and trial by jury, but a single act of an individual may be punished both by city and
state. Thus § 10 does not apply to prosecutions by cities. Therefore there is no
constitutional right to a trial by jury where the prosecution is under a city ordinance.
10 Twenty-five states, either by holding or dictum, adhere to the majority position
while about four states without the aid of statute take a minority position. Michigan
and Minnesota are in question. See Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603,
42 N.W. 1068 (1889); State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959).11 It should be pointed out that the great majority of state courts have based their
decisions on their own statutes and constitutions, and have not considered the impact
which the United States Constitution might have.
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the single criminal act constitutes two offenses, one against the city
and one against the state; 2) the civil action doctrine: that a prosecu-
tion for an ordinance violation is an exercise of police power while
prosecution for violation of a statute is an exercise of judicial power;
3) the policy doctrine: that there are areas in which it is necessary
for both the city and the state to regulate and prosecute independently
without the possibility of being precluded by the other's prior prosecu-
tion; 4) the assume-the-conclusion doctrine: that in order to prevent
a conflict between the ordinance and the statute, both must be able to
prosecute; and 5) the precedent doctrine: that the court is bound
to follow the majority rule.
Double Offense Doctrine. Many courts adopt the reasoning that a
city and a state constitute two distinct political entities. 2 Some
courts 8 support this theory by analogy to the United States Supreme
Court holdings that the states and the federal government are dual
sovereigns, both of which can prosecute for the same act. 4 It follows
that since both the state and federal governments can prosecute with-
out violating the double jeopardy restriction, then both a city and
state may prosecute. These courts dissect the single act of the de-
fendant into two offenses, one against the city and one against the
state. Thus, since two offenses were discovered, there can be no
double jeopardy because that bar applies only when the "same offense"
is involved. 5
There are at least two vulnerable aspects of this argument. First,
the argument assumes that a city and a state are separate sovereigns.
This position is flatly contradicted by many state cases holding that
a city is an arm and agency of the state legislature and subordinate to
its power.' Furthermore, the analogy from the federal-state relation-
ship is dubious because a clear distinction exists between state-federal
relationships, as defined by the United States Constitution, 7 and the
city-state relationships which are not so governed.' To elucidate, the
12 See for example State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 360, 49 N.W2d 777 (1951).
Is See State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913 (1882). State v. Hoben, 256 Minn.
436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959), limits the Lee case.
'4 Cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959).
3
5 Theisin v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).
10 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P2d 614 (1958), recognized
the contradiction. Colorado was committed to the majority position in Hughes v.
People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 50 (1885). The Merris case severely undermines the
prior cases. See also State v. Reid, 19 N.J. Super. 32, 87 A2d 562 (1952).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
I8 Compare the language of the United States Constitution amendment X: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to
1963]
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powers of the state are independent of the federal government, while
the powers of the city government depend entirely on the state, 9
except in certain circumstances." The city is wholly a creature of the
state. 1 Indeed, it would seem that a more appropriate analogy is to
the relationship of the federal government with its territories.22 The
Supreme Court has held that after a prosecution by a territory, the
fifth amendment will preclude a subsequent prosecution by the federal
government. 2' The converse is also true.24 The Supreme Court has
ruled that:
If . ..a person be tried for an offense in a tribunal deriving its
jurisdiction and authority from the United States, and is acquitted
or convicted, he cannot again be tried for the same offense in another
tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the United
States.
25
Even if the analogy to the federal-state double jeopardy rule is
granted, there is some doubt as to the continued life of this rule. At
least three Justices currently believe that the prohibition of the United
States Constitution against double jeopardy applies to the states or
the federal government whenever the other sovereign has first prose-
cuted for a single action that would constitute "two offenses. 26 Should
this dissent prevail, then the main support to city-state multiple
prosecutions would necessarily be destroyed.
Civil Action Doctrine. A group of state courts characterize a
prosecution under an ordinance as a civil action. Under this view,
there is no double jeopardy if the state subsequently prosecutes
because the double jeopardy bar only prohibits a second "criminal"
prosecution for the same act.2 Thus, by classifying the state action as
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Tith the Wash-
ington Constitution article XI § 10: "[C]ities or towns heretofore or hereafter
organized and all charters thereof framed or adopted by authority of this Constitution
shall be subject to, and controlled by general laws."
19 Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603, 42 N.W. 1068 (1889).
20 See Comment, The State v. The City: a Study in Pre-emption, 36 So. CAlt. L.
Rv. 430 (1963).
21 See 37 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 4 (1941) and cases cited.
22 Washington recognized this possibility in State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242
Pac. 363 (1926), but the Washington court felt bound to follow the majority view.
23 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
24 Puerto Rico v. Shell Oil, 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
25 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907).
26 See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 201
(1959) and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959). Mr. Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in both dissents.
27 E.g., City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (1942).
28 State v. Williams, 21 N.J. Misc. 329, 34 A.2d 141 (Recorder's Ct. 1943). See
also Atkinson v. Parsekian 37 N.J. 143, 179 A.2d 732 (1962). But see State v. Will-
hite, 40 N.J. Super 405, 123 A.2d 237 (County Ct. 1956).
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the 'first criminal' prosecution, these courts -avoid the double jeopardy
argument. However, these state courts fail tW clarify the exact status
of a prosecution under an ordinance. In fact, some courts* indicate that
the prosecution is "quasi-criminal."29 There are also variations of
classifications depending on the right claimed by the defendant, i.e.,
the prosecution may be criminal for one purpose and civil for another."
Or there may be variations of the classification depending. on whether
the state also has legislated in the area.s ' For. example, in Michigan the
prosecution is civil if it is .for the -collection of a -fine, but if imprison-
ment is possible, then it is criminal.8 - The courts may treat ordinance
prosecutions as sui generis.3" The result of 'the variations has been
the creation of a great deal of confusion."
The core of the confusion comes from the definition of the word
"crime." Some courts define "crime" as any act in violation of "public
law."" These courts hold that- only a state statute qualifies as a
"public law." Thus a city ordinance mhst be classified as a "local
law."3" Other courts imply that a necessary element .if a criminal
action is imprisonment." These courts state that a prosecution under
an ordinance is a suit to recover a fine,-..a penalty, 9 or a.debt, 0 and
29 City of Seina v. Shivers, 150 Ala. 502, 43 So. 565 (1907).,30 City of Chicago v. Knobel, 232 Ill. 112, 83 -N.E. 459.(1908)- (civil.for purpose of
trial by jury) ; City of Chicago v. Lord, 3 Il. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439 (1954),
aff'd, 7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 N.E2d 504 (1955) (criminal for purpose of tinlawful search
and seizure and self incrimination). Compare State v." Hoben, 256' Minn.. 436; 98
N.W.2d 813 (1959), with State v. End, 232 Minn. 266, 45 N.W2d 378 (1950)
(dictum) (under an ordinance prosecution the city need not prove kuilt beyond a
reasonable doubt), and City of St. Paul v. Stamn, 106 Minn. 81, 118 N.W. 154
(1908) (city cannot appeal from acquittal under an ordinane ~prosecution).
31 See note 28 supra.. In Chicago v. Lord, 3 -Ill..,App 2d 410, 122. N.E2d 439
(1954), aff'd, 7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955), the court said the action is
criminal in nature since it constituted a violation of the -public law (state law). On
the basis of that statement it is hard to see any case where double jeopardy by a
city and a state prosecution would arise when there would not be a violation of the
public law, thus the city prosecution would be a criminal prosecution. See also E.x
parte Simmons, 4 Okla. Crim. 662, 112 Pac. 951 (191-1) (quasi criminal).
32 Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603, 42 N-W. 1068 (1889).
33 State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959).
•4 The early Colorado cases are in point. Compare City of -Greelky v. Hamman,
12 Colo. 94, 20 Pac. 1 (1888) and Noland v. People, S3"CoIo. 322, 80 Pac. 887 (1905),
with City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P2d 614 (1958).
35 City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935- (1942).
3t Ibid.
37 Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603; 42 N.W. 1068 (1889) ; City of
Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d'935 (1942). But see City of
Greely v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94, 20 Pac. 1 (1888).
3s Town of Canton v. McDaniel, 188 Mo. 207, 86 S.W. 1092 (1905).
S9 State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939): But see City of Hudson
v. Granger, 23 Misc. 401, 52 N.Y.S. 9 (Sup. Ct 1898).
40 In Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603, 42 N.W. 1068 (1889), the
court admits the prosecution is to recover a fine, but the court says the prosecution
is in the nature of a proceeding for a debt.
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thus, it is viewed as a civil action." This reasoning necessarily dis-
regards the conventional definition of "debt. '4 2 Another inconsistency
with the "debt" concept is shown when the ordinance prescribes im-
prisonment until the fine is paid.4 3 In many, if not most, jurisdictions
imprisonment for a debt is prohibited by the state constitution."
The confusion in this area is shown by the following quotation:
[A] prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance is a civil action ...
though concededly resembling a criminal action in its effects and con-
sequences. Regarding it with respect to both form and substance, it
partakes of some of the features of each character of action ...
In the sense that its primary object is to punish, a prosecution for
the violation of a city ordinance is undoubtedly criminal in its purpose
but nevertheless civil in form, and especially so when regarded as an
action for the recovery of a debt representing the amount of the fine or
penalty imposed against the defendant for violation of the ordinance.
Where the I)unishment prescribed by the ordinance may, in the first
instance, be the imprisonment of the defendant, the conception of the
action as one for the recovery of the debt will of course no longer
obtain . .. but even so the proceeding, though its sole object is to
punish, is nevertheless not a proceeding to punish for the commission
of a crime in the accurate legal sense of the term. This for the reason
that a crime is an act committed in violation of the public law, that is,
a law coextensive with the boundaries of the state which enacts it,
while an ordinance, on the contrary, is no more than a mere local
police regulation passed in pursuance of and in subordination to the
general or public law for the preservation of peace and the promotion
of good order in a particular locality.4"
In contrast with the above quoted statement that an ordinance prosecu-
tion is civil in form, Nebraska holds that a prosecution for violation
of an ordinance is criminal in form, but, in fact, it is really a civil
action. 6
41 Coin-pare City of Greely v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94, 20 Pac. 1 (1888) (holding
that a prosecution under a city ordinance is civil thus allowing an appeal by the
city), with Noland v. People, 33 Colo. 322, 80 Pac. 887 (1905) (holding that the
second prosecution by the same city is barred by the restriction against doublejeopardy, the prosecutions being quasi criminal).
42 "Debt" is defined as "A sum of money due by certain and express agreement ...
and does not depend upon any subsequent valuation to settle it." BLACK, LAw Dic-
TIONARY 490 (4th ed. 1951). Certainly one cannot find an express agreement to
pay a fine for speeding in violation of a traffic rule, nor is the amount of the fine
always certain, indeed, the trial judge may suspend the fine.
4"This was argued by the petitioner for habeas corpus in Harlow v. Clow, 110
Ore. 257, 223 Pac. 541 (1924). The court said the imprisonment is not a punishment
but a means of enforcing payment, therefore the imprisonment does not come within
Oregon CONST. art. 1, § 19 which prohibits imprisonment for a debt.
44 "Wash. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17.
4. City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935, 937, 938 (1942).
4,6 State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939).
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One simply cannot deny that the purpose of a prosecution under an
ordinance is that of seeking to impose a criminal sanction.-, Further-
more, form-procedural form-is normally criminal procedure, i.e., a
criminal complaint is issued, no answer is required of the defendant,
the defendant pleads guilty or not guilty, etc.48 The realistic con-
clusion is that the "criminal-civil" distinction is fictitious.49 It only
adds confusion to an already clouded area.
Police Power Doctrine. A few courts argue that a prosecution for
violating a city ordinance represents an exercise of police power while
a prosecution for violating a state statute constitutes an exercise of
judicial power."0 The underlying reason supporting this distinction is
not fully explained, but it appears to be that the prohibition against
double jeapardy is operative only in "judicial" trials. Therefore, if
the city prosecution did not constitute a "judicial trial," there could
not be double jeopardy. This approach seems abortive, particularly
when one examines the definitions of "police power,"'" "judicial
power '5 2 and "trial." 3 This distinction between the powers exercised
by city courts and those exercised by state courts, is evasive, and
probably non-existent." It is apparent that any court that uses this
rationale is grasping at straws to support a pre-determined conclusion.
Policy Doctrine. Some courts take the approach that a criminal act
done in a city involves more risks than the same act done outside a
city." Thus, the increased penalty for the city offender through
47 City of Hudson v. Granger, 23 Misc. 401, 52 N.Y.S. 9 (Sup. Ct 1898). See also
People v. Ward, 146 Misc. 606, 263 N.Y.S. 511 (County Ct. 1933).
48 Ibid.
'9 See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); United States v. La
Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) and cases cited. The United States Supreme Court in
both the Constantine and La Franca cases was dealing with federal tax cases and
refused to be governed by mere form. In Constantine the Court said: "If in reality
a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by so naming it, and we must ascribe to
it the character disclosed by its purpose and operation, regardless of name." 296
U.S. at 294.
GO The beginning of this doctrine was probably Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331
(1861). See also Kemper v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 219, 3 S.W. 159 (1887) ; State
v. Clifford, 45 La. Ann. 980, 13 So. 281 (1893); State v. Sly, 4 Ore. 277 (1872)
(dictum).
5, Police power normally means the establishment of laws, not their adjudication.
See BLAcx, LAW DIcMoNARY, 1317 (4th ed. 1951).
5 2 "The authority vested in courts and judges as distinguished from the executive
and legislative power" BLACK, LAW DIc OxARY, 986 (4th ed. 1951).
53 "A judicial examination ... of a cause.. . " BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, 1675
(4th ed. 1951).
54 See Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 50 (1885), where the court admits
that the double offense doctrine, civil action doctrine, and the police power doctrine
are fictitious, but the court nevertheless adopted the majority rule allowing the double,
prosecutions. Not until City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614
(1958), did the court overrule this position.
55 Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S.E. 564 (1862). See also EX parte Sloan,
47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac. 233 (1923).
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double prosecutions by the city and state, is justified on the basis
of the additional risk." This argument assumes that the needs of a
city are peculiar to it and are not provided for by the state legislature
in its general statewide prohibitions."
Perhaps the above policy reasoning is behind many court decisions
notwithstanding the use of more traditional language by the courts."
One such traditional theory used by these courts is that the city and
state are separate jurisdictions;" this theory was discussed earlier.
The assumption in the policy doctrine that the increased risks
warrant double prosecutions is fallacious. The courts making that
assumption overlook other alternative ways in which the problem of
increased risks can be handled. There are at least two such alterna-
tives. First, the state may use home rule concepts which distinguish
between the needs for state uniformity and local rule. A second alter-
native would give discretion to the judge hearing the matter to alter
the penalty according to the risk. Both alternatives are discussed
below.
Under the home rule concept," state law should be supreme where
uniformity is needed, but where matters are local, then the municipal
laws should supersede state law.6 Of course the. local-uniformity con-
cept may be difficult to apply in the borderline cases.62 Nevertheless,
there are notable examples of areas where the uniformity concept is
adequate. For example, some problems of traffic regulation are subject
to uniformity." On the other hand if the problem has serious local
ramifications, such as acts creating abnormal risks, then the court may
deem the area one properly regulated at the local level. In such a
case the city can prescribe penalties coextensive with the risks created
by the act. If the regulation by the city supersedes the state's regula-
tion in this area, then the defendant is punished but once.64 This
56 Compare, Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 Ill. 11 (1879) with In re Monroe, 13
Okla. Crim. 62, 162 Pac. 233 (1917).
57 Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S.E. 564 (1892).
58 A familiar statement by courts is found in State v. Mills, 108 W.Va. 31, 150
S.E..142, 144 (1929): "[P]rosecutions of each [city and state] offense proceeds upon
a different hypothesis; the former contemplates disturbance of the peace and good
order of the city; the other had a more enlarged object in view-the maintenance of
the peace and dignity of the state. Therefore, a conviction under such ordinance [sic.,
indictment?] for one may not be pleaded in bar of a conviction under indictment for
the other." But see In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac. 405 (1887).
59 Town of Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 14 S.W. 38 (1890).
60 Home rule is in force in Washington. See Wash. CoNsT. art. 11, § 10.
61 See City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958). See also
In re Lane, 22 Cal. Reptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
62 Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961).
63 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1948) (driving
while under the influence of alcohol).
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procedure would seem to satisfy both the policy considerations and the
double jeopardy requirements.
The uniformity-local distinction may be applied even where home
rule is not in force."5 The application will be through the pre-emption
doctrine." Here the court will be more apt to apply pre-emption where
uniformity is needed.67
The second alternative is to allow the judge to determine whether
a more severe penalty may or may not be warranted due to the circum-
stances of the criminal act in question. This alternative would have
the benefits of a single prosecution and yet provide for a penalty in
terms of the risk created.
Assume-the-Conclusion Doctrine. Some courts begin with the con-
clusion that city action should not bar effective state prosecution. In
order to protect this conclusion, the court then rules that there is no
double jeopardy when the city has already prosecuted the defendant."
These courts overlook the other possible alternative: the court could
rule the ordinance invalid and the conviction void. This would leave
the state free to prosecute without any double jeopardy claim.
Precedent Doctrine. Some states blindly follow the majority rule."
A noteable example is the Washington court. While appearing to
recognize that the reasoning of the minority of courts is superior, the
Washington court conceived itself bound to follow the majority posi-
tion and allowed a double prosecution." The precedent doctrine con-
tains an element of conflict for Washington. In 1959 the Washington
court said that where the Washington constitution and the United
States Constitution are identical in thought, substance and purpose, as
they are in Article 1, Sec. 9 of the Washington constitution and the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution, then the Washington court will give the same interpreta-
tion to the provision as the United States has given to its Constitution.71
64 For an analogous argument see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 at 157 (1959)
(dissenting opinion of Black, J.).65 City of Billings v. Herold, 130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956).
06 Ibid.67 In re Lane, 22 Cal. Reptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1962).68 There seems to be this element of reasoning running through Robbins v. People,
95 Ill. 175 (1880).6) Hughes v. Peple, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 50 (1885) ; Koch v. State, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct.
R. 641 (1894), af'd, 53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N.E. 689 (1895); State v. Tucker, 137
Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363 (1926).t State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363 (1926). However, on the basis
of State v. Taylor, 142 Wash. 528, 253 Pac. 796 (1927), the defendant might persuade
the judge of the second trial to suspend the penalty if the defendant has already been
punished for the same offense.
71 State v. Schoel, 54 Wn2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959).
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As we have seen, the United States Supreme Court has taken the
minority position prohibiting double prosecution in the analogous
situation where federal and territorial laws are involved. 2
The Minority Rule. Some states do not allow double prosecutions
by a city and a state for the same criminal act. The reasons include:
1) a statute prohibits double prosecution; 2) a city having an ordin-
ance which duplicates a statute creates a conflict where both are
enforced, so the ordinance must yield; and 3) both the statute and
ordinance are based on the same authority which precludes double
prosecutions.
Statute. Some states have passed statutes preventing double prose-
cutions by city and state." Such a statute will, of course, be in
derogation of the common law, and therefore interpreted strictly by
the courts."4
Conflict. Some states, where the question of double prosecution has
risen, have assumed that it would be double jeopardy for a city and
a state to prosecute. Thus the ordinance is held invalid as conflicting
with the state statute because an ordinance prosecution would preclude
the enforcement of the statute."5 It is sometimes difficult to identify
the exact reasoning of a court in this type of case."8 There appear to be
three alternative constructions of a statute-ordinance conflict. In the
first situation the court may hold that the double jeopardy rule would
prohibit both the city and state from prosecuting. 7 Or secondly, the
court may reason that the home rule local-uniformity distinction may
apply," and that the area regulated is one requiring uniform regula-
tion." Thus the city is precluded from regulating this area.80 Thirdly,
the preemption doctrine may be applied."1 The court will here decide
that the state, by passing an act in this area, intended to pre-empt the
72 See text accompanying notes 23 and 24, supra.
73 For an example see the Arkansas statutes and the construction given by the
court. The statute, as construed, applies only if there has been a prior conviction.
Smith v. State, 136 Ark. 263, 206 S.W. 437 (1918) ; Champion v. State, 110 Ark. 44,
160 S.W. 878 (1913) ; Richardson v. State, 56 Ark. 367, 19 S.W. 1052 (1892). For
other states with statutes and cases construing the statutes see the appendix.
4 Johns v. State, 13 Ala. App. 383, 69 So. 259 (1915), cert. denied, 70 So. 1013
(1915).
75 In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac. 405 (1887) ; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128
1854).
76 City of Billings v. Herold, 130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956).
77 See Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128 (1854).
7 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
79 Davis v. City and County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959).
8o See earlier discussion in text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
81 This is probably the most significant reason in City of Billings v. Herold, 130
Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956).
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entire area and any ordinance regulating the same area is therefore in
conflict and accordingly is void. 2
Single Sovereign. The most persuasive reason why there is double
jeopardy where a city and a state prosecute is that both an ordinance
prosecution and a prosecution under a state statute are based on the
same ultimate authority, namely, the state.8" It has often been held
that a city is a mere creature of the state and is responsible to
the state.8 Thus, it would seem that the city prosecutes as an agent
of the state, and this should preclude a subsequent prosecution by the
state in its more direct capacity. The converse, that an earlier prosecu-
tion by a state bars a subsequent city prosecution, should also follow.85
The Position of the United States Supreme Court. To the present
date the Supreme Court has not been asked to test the constitutionality
of a double prosecution by a city and a state."s However, we should
examine the arguments that would be considered by the Supreme
Court. An argument seeking to prohibit double prosecutions by both
a city and a state may take any of three positions: 1) that the double
prosecution violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment; 2) that the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeop-
ardy should apply to the states as well as to the federal government;
and 3) that the double prosecution violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Due Process. In Palko v. Connecticut,"' the court held that an act,
here a statute, of the state does not necessarily violate the fourteenth
amendment just because a similar act by the federal government would
violate the fifth amendment. The Court in Palko set up the familiar
test to determine whether the particular right claimed by the defendant
is within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. The test is
whether the right violated is of "the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty."88 In addition the Court announced another test which
8 2 
It& re Lane, 22 Cal. Reptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
83 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).84 State v. Reid, 19 N.J. Super. 32, 87 A.2d 562 (County Ct 1952), recognized this
but it held that for the purpose of double jeopardy the city and state are regarded as
separate bodies.85 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) ; People of Puerto Rico v. Shell
Oil, 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
16 In two cases the court could have decided this issue, but it declined to do so.
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Flemister v. United States, 207 U.S.
372 (1907).
87302 U.S. 319 (1937). Defendant was charged with first degree murder. Thejury found him guilty of second degree murder. The state under statutory authority
appealed and upon reversal retried defendant for first degree murder.8 8 Id. at 325.
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is directed to the double jeopardy issue of that case: "Is that kind of
double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it." 9
The "shock" test appears to be wholly inadequate to determine the
applicability of the fourteenth amendment to the problem of double
prosecutions by a city and a state. Assuming that prosecutions by a
city and a state are in effect like two state prosecutions," the question
remains whether the double prosecution is "a hardship so acute and
shocking that our polity will not endure it?" When emphasis is placed
on the test of state endurance, it must be recognized that most of the
states have endured this double prosecution, although there have been
some statutory enactments in this area. 1 If we view the test as one
which measures "shock" or conversely "unreasonableness," then we
run into another difficulty. The impossibility of applying a shock test
was emphasized in two search and seizure cases.2 This impossibility
is even more acute in the double prosecution area. Mr. Justice Clark
said, concurring in Irvine v. California," that what may be shocking
to one person may not be to another; the result is unpredictability.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in applying the Palko case, the double
prosecution by the city and state should not be permitted even under
the Palko tests. The Palko Court, while dealing with a double jeop-
ardy argument, intimated that there are different kinds of "double
jeopardy," i.e., some kinds that might be prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment, and some that are not.9 In fact, the Court specifically
reserved the decision concerning the type of double prosecution to
which this comment is addressed stating:
What the answer [to a double jeopardy claim] would have to be if the
state were permitted after a trial free from error to try the accused
over again or to bring another case against him, we have no occasion
to consider.9 5
89 Id. at 328.
90 See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
91 See note 73 supra, and appendix.
92 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); Irvine v.
California 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (concurring opinion).
93347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954).
94 The Court held that the type of double jeopardy where the state can appeal a
criminal case is not the kind that is prohibited by the Constitution. The Court said:
"Is double jeopardy in such circumstances, if double jeopardy it must be called, a
denial of due process forbidden to the States? The tyranny of labels ... must not lead
us to leap to a conclusion that a word which in one set of facts may stand for oppres-
sion or enormity is of like effect in every other." 302 U.S. at 323.
95 302 U.S. at 328.
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On the basis of the Court's reservation it seems that there is still room
to argue that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
should bar double prosecutions by the city and state.
There are two hurdles for a successful due process argument. The
first problem is whether the court will consider a city prosecution as a
prosecution by the state. If this proposition is accepted then a second
trial by the state court results in two trials and two punishments for a
single offense. This idea has previously been discussed." The second
hurdle, once the court has disposed of the double sovereignty fallacy,
is whether the court will consider that this kind of double jeopardy is a
violation "of the scheme of ordered liberty." In making this decision
the Court should keep in mind that the prohibition against double
jeopardy is considered so fundamental to liberty that it has found its
way into most of the constitutions of the states."7
Fiftk Amendment. On the basis of the two dissents, in Hoag v. New
Jersey8 and Bartkus v. Illinois9 an argument might be made that the
Court should apply the fifth amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy to the states. Mr. Justice Black stated his views in regard to
double prosecutions by the federal government and a state in Bartkus:
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two
"Sovereigns" to inflict it than one. If danger to the innocent is em-
phasized, that danger is surely no less when the power of State and
Federal Governments is brought to bear on one man in two trials, than
when one of these "Sovereigns" proceeds alone. In each case, inescap-
ably, a man is forced to face danger twice for the same conduct. 100
This same line of reasoning has equal applicability to double prosecu-
tions by a city and a state. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Hoag,
stated that the same standard used in federal cases, i.e., the constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy, should be used to judge
state prosecutions as well. 1 ' While these are minority views, they are
due definite respect as possible prophesies of the future.
Equal Protection The basis for an equal protection argument is
that the state is treating the class of city offenders differently from the
90 See text accompanying notes 15-25 supra.
07 See Kneier, Prosecutions Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double
Jeopardy, 16 CoazI.s L. Q. 201, 202 n. 4 (1931).
0s 356 U.S. 464, 477 (1958) (Douglas, 3., dissenting with Mr. justice Black con-
curring).
90 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, 3., dissenting with Mr. C. J. Warren and Mr.
J. Douglas concurring).
10 1d. at 155.
101 356 U.S. 464, at 477 (1958).
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class of offenders whose criminal acts were committed outside the city.
Where the offender did not commit the criminal act in a city, he is
subject only to the penalty provided by statute. But the offender
whose criminal acts were in a city is subject to the same statutory
penalty, plus an additional penalty when the state, indirectly through
the city, prosecutes the defendant for violation of the city ordinance
and exacts from him the penalty imposed by the ordinance." 2 As
there is no apparent reason for treating one offender differently from
the other, an invidious discrimination results, and a state, by allowing
two prosecutions for the same act, has violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
Such an argument seems to have validity, but it rests on two
premises that have been controverted by the states, namely, that the
city and state are one sovereign, and that there is no reason to treat
the city offender differently than an offender outside the city. The
first of the two premises has been previously discussed. 4 The second
premise should be viewed a little more carefully.
As prior discussion indicated, some courts take the position that an
offense committed in a city presents a greater risk of harm than does
an offense committed outside the city.0 5 On this premise courts have
said that double punishment through double prosecutions is merited.
If one views this argument without regard to the reasonable alterna-
tives open to the state legislatures, one might admit that the argument
has some validity. However, it would appear that there are reasonable
alternatives open to the legislature by which it could take into account
the added danger of the offense which is committed in the city. 6 For
example, discretion might be left to the trial judge to impose a more
stringent penalty for a violation of the law, particularly where the risk
of harm varies according to the place where the offense was committed.
While the discretion rule would impose an additional burden on the
trial judge, it is the lesser evil when compared with the present rule
which subjects the defendant to multiple prosecutions. In support of
the argument that the double punishment is the greater of the two
evils, one need only remember that double prosecutions have been
102 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). For an opposite view see Kemper v.
Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 219, 3 S.W. 159 (1887) ; In re Monroe, 13 Okla. Crim. 62, 162
Pac. 233 (1917) (dictum).
1o See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissent).
104 See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
105 See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
106 Ibid.
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considered of sufficient evil to warrant a prohibiting provision in most
of the state constitutions.07
CONCLUSION
Most courts hold that a city can prosecute a defendant under
a city ordinance, and in addition, a state may prosecute the same
defendant for the same act on the basis of a state statute. The most
common theory uses the analogy of the state-federal relationship.
Thus, the city and state are said to be separate sovereigns punishing
different "offenses." Another common theory holds that the prosecu-
tion by the city is a civil action while the state prosecution is criminal.
These reasons are often contradicted by other statements by the same
courts, i.e., they say that the city is an agent of the state, but the city
trial is criminal for purposes of procedure and form.
Nor are double punishments necessary, as some courts suggest, to
protect a city and state. There are other alternatives available besides
double prosecutions to adequately reflect the increased risk created by
the city offender; namely, the sentencing power of the judge and the
local-uniform concept used in home-rule states.
In a few states the minority rule, disallowing double prosecutions,
is followed, either because a statute governs or because the court
recognizes that the city prosecution is indirectly a state prosecution.
While the problem here faced has not yet reached the Supreme
Court, one could argue that the United States Constitution prohibits
this type of double prosecution. Such argument would be based on the
possible future application of the fifth amendment to the states, or
that the states in allowing double prosecutions are violating the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. A decision accepting
one of these arguments would eliminate the illogical and unfortunate
double prosecution by both a city and a state.
L. WLAm HoUGER
APPENDIX
This appendix attempts to set out the important cases in the states
and Philippine jurisdictions which have been decided with regard to
the issue of double prosecutions by a city and a state. In addition,
there are also set out the states which have not dealt with the issue
directly, but which have given some indication of their position. For
o20 See note 97 mtpra.
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other summaries of this area see Kneier, Prosecutions Under State Law
and Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 201
(1931); United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 (1913).
Alabama: Allows double prosecutions.
At an early date, Alabama allowed double prosecutions. Mayor v.
Allaire, °8 Black v. State. °9
Subsequently the legislature enacted 1907 Code §§ 1221, 1222 which
disallowed double prosecutions. See Cast v. State,"' Gustin v. State,"'
Ex parte Ratley."2
The statute was amended in 1915 deleting the bar against double
prosecution. The court reverted to its pre-1907 view. Bell v. State,"'
Schroeder v. State,"4 Williams v. State,"5 Leach v. State,"6 Morgan v.
State," ' Marchman v. State"8 Howell v. City of Fort Payne,"9 Slayton
v. State,2 ' Billingsley v. State, 2' Pike v. City of Birmingham,2' Inman
v. State.' For other relevant cases see Perry v. City of Birmingham...
and Shields v. State.'
Alaska: Undecided.
There exists one federal district court decision which held that
double presecutions are allowed in Alaska. United States v. Farwell.'
Arkansas: Allows double prosecutions in certain cases only.
At an early date double prosecutions were allowed. Town of Van
Buren v. Wells.'
Subsequently a statute, Acts of 1891, p. 97, § 3 was enacted. The
108 14 Ala. 400 (1849).
109 144 Ala. 92, 40 So. 611 (1906).
11" 11 Ala. App. 177, 65 So. 718 (1914).
1- 10 Ala. App. 171, 65 So. 302 (1914), cert. denied, 66 So. 1008 (1914).
112 188 Ala. 107, 66 So. 147 (1914).
"13 16 Ala. App. 36, 75 So. 181 (1917), aff'd, 200 Ala. 364, 76 So. 1 (1917).
14 17 Ala. App. 497, 85 So. 851 (1920).
115 18 Ala. App. 218, 90 So. 36 (1921) (rev'd on other grounds).
11620 Ala. App. 15, 100 So. 306 (1924).
117 20 Ala. App. 511, 104 So. 341 (1925), cert. denied, 213 Ala. 130, 104 So. 341
(1925).
"18 21 Ala. App. 421, 109 So. 121 (1926).
19 246 Ala. 315, 20 So. 2d 880 (1945).
120 31 Ala. App. 622, 21 So. 2d 122 (1945).
121 34 Ala. App. 475, 41 So. 2d 431 (1949). This case presents the history of double
prosecution in Alabama.
12236 Ala. App. 53, 53 So. 2d 394 (1951), cert. denied, 255 Ala. 664, 53 So. 2d 396
(1951).
123 39 Ala. App. 496, 104 So. 2d 448 (1958).
124 38 Ala. App. 460, 88 So. 2d 577 (1956), cert. denied, 264 Ala. 698, 88 So. 2d 580
(1956).
125 39 Ala. App. 57, 94 So. 2d 226 (1957).
126 11 Alaska 507, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D.C. Alaska 1948).
127 53 Ark. 368, 14 S.W. 38 (1890).
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statute was construed in Richardson v. State28 and in Williams v.
State129
The statute was amended, Kirbey's Digest sec. 5633, to change the
Williams case construction and add the additional requirement that the
penalty imposed by the ordinance must be equal to the minimum
penalty imposed by the statute. 8 ' Champion v. State.8
The statute as amended does not prohibit double prosecutions where
the first prosecution results in an acquital. Smith v. State.'82
California: Disallows double prosecutions.
The important cases have been In re Sic,'88 Ex parte Knight,8 ' Ex
parte Mingo '3 and In re Lane.8
Colorado: Disallows double prosecutions.
The court has until recently allowed double prosecutions. Hughes v.
People8" and McInerney v. City of Denver.8
The court overruled the prior position in City of Canon City v.
Merris3 9
Other relevant cases are City of Greely v. Hamman,10 Noland v.
People' and Woolverton v. City and County of Denver.'42
Conneticut: Disallows double prosecutions.
The only case which holds that double prosecutions are prohibited is
Southport v. Ogden.4 Two subsequent cases, State v. Welch" and
State v. Flint,' give recognition to the prohibition in their dictum.
128 56 Ark. 367, 19 S.W. 1052 (1892).
129 63 Ark. 307, 38 S.W. 337 (1896).
180 This requirement changes the Richardson case which had used a "no collusion"
requirement. For a collusion case see State v. Caldwell, 70 Ark. 74,66 S.W. 150 (1902).
181 110 Ark. 44, 160 S.W. 878 (1913). The additional language in Champion indi-
cating that the court might be giving its decision a constitutional underpinning is
dictum and was not followed when the court had the chance. Smith v. State, 136 Ark.
263, 206 S.W. 437 (1918).
182 136 Ark. 263, 206 S.W. 437 (1918).
13 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac. 405 (1887).
184 55 Cal. App. 511, 203 Pac. 777 (1921). The dictum in the Knight case says that
double prosecutions are permissible. However, this aspect of Knight has not been
followed. See Ex parte Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 214 Pac. 850 (1923).
135 190 Cal. 769, 214 Pac. 850 (1923).
18622 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (Sup. Ct 1962). See also Comment, 36 So. CAL.
L REv. 430 (1963).
137 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 50 (1885).
13 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892).
189 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
140 12 Colo. 94, 20 Pac. 1 (1888).
14133 Colo. 322, 80 Pac. 887 (1905).
142 146 Colo. 247, 361 P2d 982 (1961).
143 233 Conn. 128 (1854).
14' 36 Conn. 215 (1869).
145 63 Conn. 248, 28 At. 28 (1893).
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Florida: Allows double prosecutions.
The relevant cases are Theisen v. McDavid,48 Bueno v. State" and
Gillooley v. Vaughn."8
Georgia:. Allows double prosecutions:
The significant cases are: Hood v. Von Glahn,"0. Sutton v. Mayor5
and Smith v. State,'5' which in its dictum throws some doubt as to the
exact status of the issue in Georgia.
The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Ga. Code Ann.
ch. 68 § 1681, has a provision preventing double prosecution. Hannah
v. State.'52
Idaho: Allows double prosecutions.
The relevant cases are: State v. Preston,5 ' In re Henry'.. and State
v. Poynter.'
Illinois: Allows double prosecutions.
See Wragg v. Penn Township,' Robbins v. People,5 ' People v.
McCanney58 and City of Chicago v. Lord.5 '
Indiana: Undecided.
In Levy v. State,6 ' the court held that double prosecutions are not
forbidden. But since then in City of Frankfort v. Aughe,"' the court
said that a city cannot prohibit an act which is also prohibited by
statute. Such a view would prevent a double prosecution. Thomas v.
City of Indianapolis.6 adds some confusion.
Iowa: Allows double prosecutions.
See Town of Noola v. Reichart... (dictum).
146 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).
147 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862 (1898).
1492 Fla. 943, 110 So. 653 (1926).
14988 Ga. 405, 14 S.E. 564 (1892).
150 4 Ga. App. 30, 60 S.E. 811 (1908).
151 88 Ga. App. 749, 77 S.E.2d 764 (1953) (dictum).
:152 97 Ga. App. 188, 102 S.E.2d 624 (1958).
153 4 Idaho 215, 38 Pac. 694 (1894).
154 15 Idaho 755, 99 Pac. 1054 (1909) (dictum).
155 70 Idaho 438, 220 P.2d 386 (1950).
156 94 Ill. 11 (1879). Here the state had two statutes, providing for punishment by
the state and allowing the city to recover a penalty.
157 95 Il. 175 (1880).
158 205 Ill. App. 91 (1917).
159 3 Ill. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439 (1954), aff'd, 7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504
(1955).
160 6 Ind. 281 (1885).
161 114 Ind. 77, 15 N.E. 802 (1888).
162 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550 (1924) (dictum).
163 131 Iowa 492, 109 N.W. 5 (1906) (dictum).
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Kansas: Allows double prosecutions.
See City of Fort Scott v. Arbuckle.Y This case is poorly reasoned.
To the writer's knowledge there are no prior Kansas cases which allow
double prosecution,"6 5 yet the court "reasoned" that since double
prosecutions are allowed in Kansas, the Kansas constitutional pro-
vision (sec. 10) did not apply to prosecutions under city ordinances,
therefore since section 10 also contained the guarantee of the right to
trial by jury, the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial.
See also City of Garden City v. Miller,6' Lawton v. Hand6' and
State v. Holmes."6 8
Kentucky: Allows double prosecutions in certain cases only.
At an early time the Kentucky court, without qualifications, allowed
double prosecutions. Kemper v. Commonwealth,'69 Commonwealth v.
Parks'" and Fortner v. Duncan.7  Lynch v. Commonwealth 2 is not
clear.
Kentucky Constitution § 168 requires that where an ordinance and
a statute prohibit the same act the ordinance is to provide the same
penalty as the statute and the prosecution under one bars prosecution
under the other. White v. Commonwealth. 8
An ordinance which does not provide the same penalty is invalid.
City of Newport v. Nier.'7
If there is no statute, and the state prosecutes on the basis of
common law, then the constitutional inhibition does not apply. Respass
v. Commonwealth,' Lucas v. Commonwealth,' 6 Ehrlick v. Common-
wealth77 and Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Commonwealth. 8
Louisiana: Allows double prosecutions.
See State v. Fourcadel" and State v. Clifford8 0
164 165 Kan. 374, 196 P2d 217 (1948).
1'5 State v. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, 12 Pac. 310 (1886), however, uses the same
rationale in the same manner.
169 181 Kan. 360, 311 P.2d 306 (1957).
167 186 Kan. 385, 350 P.2d 28 (1960).
168 191 Kan. 126, 379 P2d 304 (1963).
169 85 Ky. 219, 3 S.W. 159 (1887).
17011 Ky. L. Rep. 403 (1889).
'7' 91 Ky. 171, 15 S.W. 55 (1891).
17218 ICy. L. Rep. 145, 35 S.W. 264 (1896).
13 122 Ky. 408, 92 S.W. 285 (1906).
174239 S.W2d 491 (Ky. 1951).
175107 Ky. 139, 53 S.W. 24 (1899).
170 118 Ky. 818, 82 S.W. 440 (1904).
177125 Ky. 742, 102 S.W. 289 (1907).
178 144 Ky. 558, 139 S.W. 785 (1911).
179 45 La. Ann. 717, 13 So. 187 (1893).
180 45 La. Ann. 980, 13 So. 281 (1893).
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Maryland: Allows double prosecutions.
See Shafer v. Mumma"' and Norwood v. Wiseman.'
Michigan: Undecided.
Village of Northville v. Westfall 8  might be an indication that the
court will hold as civil an action for a fine by a city, therefore a double
prosecution is available. But West fall also indicates that where im-
prisonment is possible the prosecution under the ordinance is criminal.
Thus Michigan might allow double prosecution where the city prosecu-
tions are for a fine, and disallow double prosecutions where the city
prosecution could result in imprisonment.
Minnesota: 8 ' Disallows double prosecutions.
The court was severely split in its first case concerning city and state
prosecutions. State v. Oleson'8
Subsequently the court slowly resolved the doubt. State v. Lee,'86
State v. Cavett"' and State v. End. "' Some of the reasoning in the
Lee case is contrary to City of St. Paul v. Stamm.'
Presently there is some confusion. In State v. Hoben,9 ° the court
puts some restriction on the prior cases of Lee, Cavett, and End. It
would appear that at least where the ordinance carries "more serious
sanctions" or denounces the same act which a statute also prohibits,
there cannot be double prosecutions.
Mississippi: Allows double prosecutions.
See Johnson v. State'9' and May v. Town of Carthage.9'
Missouri: Allows double prosecutions.
The court followed the minority rule in its first few cases. State v.
Simonds,9 ' State v. Cowan,' State v. Thornton,9 ' City of Pilot Grove
v. McCormick ... and State v. Freeman. 7
181 17 Md. 331 (1861).
182141 Md. 696, 119 Atl. 688 (1922).
18875 Mich. 603, 42 N.W. 1068 (1889).
184 One can only hesitantly conclude that Minnesota disallows double prosecution.
There may be cases where double prosecutions are still allowed. See State v. Hoben,
256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959).
185 26 Minn. 507, 5 N.W. 959 (1880).
18629 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913 (1882).
18 171 Minn. 505, 214 N.W. 479 (1927).
188 232 Minn. 266, 45 N.W.2d 378 (1950).
189 106 Minn. 81, 118 N.W. 154 (1908).
190 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959). This case is concerned with the technical
issue of trial by jury but it purports to deal with criminal procedure, including doublejeopardy, generally.
1'3 59 Miss. 543 (1882).
192 191 Miss. 97, 2 So. 2d 801 (1941). 195 37 Mo. 360 (1866).
19s 3 Mo. 414 (1834). 19656 Mo. App. 530 (1894) (dictum).
19429 Mo. 330 (1860). 19756 Mo. App. 579 (1894).
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The court, however, changed its view. State v. Gustin,"8 State v.
Muir,' Town of Canton v. McDaniel,"' City of Clayton v. Nemours2 '
State v. Jackson,2 ' State v. Garner,"3 and City of St. Louis v.
Mueller.",
Other relevant cases are King City v. Duncan.5 and City of Webster
Groves v. Quick. 00
Montana: Disallows double prosecutions.
See City of Billings v. Herold.207
Nebraska: Allows double prosecutions.
See State v. Hauser"8 and State v. Amick.
2 11
Nevada: Allows double prosecutions.
See Ex parte Sloan."'
New Jersey: Allows double prosecutions.
See State v. Reid. 11
New York: Undecided.
There have been no cases on the double prosecutions issue, but
there are two cases that at least admit that city prosecutions are
criminal. City of Hudson v. Granger212 and People v. Ward. 13
North Carolina: Disallows double prosecutions.
While there are no cases directly on point, there is a case, State v.
Keith,21 which declares an ordinance void which prohibits acts which
are also prohibited by state law. Thus the double prosecution point
should not arise.
North Dakota: Allows double prosecutions.
State v. Simpson.2
15
195 152 Mo. 108, 53 S.W. 421 (1899) (dictum).
109 86 Mo. App. 642 (1901), aff'd, 164 Mo. 610, 65 S.W. 285 (1901).
200 188 Mo. 207, 86 S.W. 1092 (1905).
201237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (1942).
202 220 S.W2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
203 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W2d 604 (1950).
204313 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
205238 Mo. 513, 142 S.W. 246 (1911).
200 319 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1959).
207130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956) (dictum).
20S 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939).
209173 Neb. 770, 114 N.W2d 893 (1962) (dictum).
210 47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac. 233 (1923).
21119 N.J. Super. 32, 87 A.2d 562 (1952).
212 23 Misc. 401, 52 N.Y.S. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
213 146 Misc. 606, 263 N.Y.S. 511 (County Ct. 1933).
21494 N.C. 686 (1886).
21578 N.D. 360, 49 N.W2d 777 (1951).
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Ohio: Allows double presecutions.
Koch v. State.21
Oklahoma: Allows double prosecutions.
Ex parte Simmons,"7 In re Monroe,218 Cumpton v. City of Musha-
gee,21 McCann v. State22 and Booker v. State.22'
Oregon: Allows double prosecutions.
State v. Sly, 222 Mayhew v. City of Eugene,221 Miller v. Hansen2 1-
and Claypool v. McCauley.22 5
Other relevant cases are: State v. Crawford22  and Harlow v.
Clow, 22 7
Philippines: Allows double prosecutions.
United States v. Chan-Cun-Chay,228 United States v. Flemister,229
United States v. Garcia Gaveris2" ° and United States v. Jason.
2 31
South Carolina: Disallows double prosecutions.
The court did allow double prosecutions until the statute was
passed. See City Council v. O'Donnell,2 City Council v. Leopard..
and State v. Sanders. 4
Now, however, a statute governs. South Carolina Code 1952 Art.
17-502. See State v. Butler.22
Tennessee: Allows double prosecutions.
Greenwood v. State.2 6
216 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 641 (1894), aff'd, 53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N.E. 689 (1895).
217 4 Okla. Crim. 662, 112 Pac. 951 (1911).
218 13 Okla. Crim. 62, 162 Pac. 233 (1917) (dictum).
219 23 Okla. Crim. 412, 255 Pac. 562 (1923) (dictum).
220 82 Okla. Crim. 374, 170 P.2d 562 (1946).
221 312 P.2d 189 (Okla. 1957).
2224 Ore. 277 (1872) (dictum).
223 56 Ore. 102, 104 Pac. 727 (1909) (dictum).
224 126 Ore. 297, 269 Pac. 864 (1928).
225 131 Ore. 371, 283 Pac. 751 (1929) (dictum).
226 58 Ore. 116, 113 Pac. 440 (1911).
227 110 Ore. 257, 223 Pac. 541 (1924).
228 5 Phil. 385 (1905) (dictum).
229 5 Phil. 650 (1906) (dictum), aff'd, 207 U.S. 372 (1907).
230 10 Phil. 694 (1908) (dictum).
23126 Phil. 1 (1913).
23229 S.C. 355, 7 S.E. 523 (1888) (rev'd on other grounds).
233 61 S.C. 99, 39 S.E. 248 (1901).
234 68 S.C. 192, 47 S.E. 55 (1904).
235 230 S.C. 159, 94 S.E.2d 761 (1956).
236 65 Tenn. (6 Baxt.) 567, 32 Am. Rep. 539 (1873).
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Texas: Allows double prosecutions.
A statute governs (1895 Code of Criminal Procedure §931). See
Davis v. State2' and Ex parte Freeland."8
Another relevant case is Burdett v. State."9
Virginia: Allows double prosecutions in certain cases only.
This state follows the general rule allowing double prosecutions
except where the statute provides otherwise. Morganstern v. Com-
monwealth,4" is an exception engrafted on the statute. See also
Malouf v. City of Roanoke,"4 Anthony v. Commonwealth"2 and
Kelley v. County of Brunswick.4
Bryan v. Commonwealth24' is also relevant.
Washington: Allows double prosecutions.
State v. Tucker."' Other relevant cases include: State v. Taylor,248
State v. Schoel4  and Bellingham v. Schampera.24
West Virginia: Allows double prosecutions.
State v. Mills,"' Austin v. Knight.2 50
Wisconsin: Allows double prosecutions.
Ogden v. City of Madison,23' City of Milwaukee v. Johnson"2 and
Guinther v. City of Milwaukee.213
Wyoming: Allows double prosecutions.
State v. Jackson.211
237 37 Tex. Crim. R. 359, 38 S.W. 616, reversing 39 S.W. 937 (1897).
288 38 Tex. Crim. R. 321, 42 S.W. 295 (1897) (dictum).
239116 Tex. Crim. 264, 32 S.W2d 360 (1930).
240 94 Va. 787, 26 S.E. 402 (1896).
241177 Va. 846, 13 S.E2d 319 (1941).
242 179 Va. 303, 18 S.E2d 897 (1942).
243 200 Va. 45, 104 S.E.2d 7 (1958).
244126 Va. 749, 101 S.E. 316 (1919).
245 137 Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363 (1926).
246 142 Wash. 528, 253 Pac. 796 (1927).
247 54 Wn2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959).
24s 57 Wn2d 106, 356 P2d 292 (1960).
249 108 W. Va. 31, 150 S.E. 142 (1929).
250 124 W. Va. 189, 20 S.E2d 897 (1942).
251 111 Wis. 413, 87 N.W. 568 (1901).
252 192 Wis. 585, 213 N.W. 335 (1927).
263217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935).
254 75 Wyo. 13, 291 P2d 798 (1955) (dictum).
19631
